AFK-EuPRA – Panel 17 (Part 1) and Panel 19 (Part 2):
(In)Security, (De-)Militarization, Post-Liberal Development
With the end of the arms races and world-threatening escalations of the Cold War, many hoped the world was entering into a more peaceful time. The post-Cold War era we were left with, however, turned out quite differently than expected. The known and more or less predictable bipolar security landscape morphed into mono-, resp. multipolar and asymmetric power structures, which changed security doctrines and postures substantially, while new types of actors, armed conflicts and new arms technologies emerged. The panel consists of two parts. Panel 17 will scrutinize aspects of this by and large unpredicted and unexpected course of history, highlighting milestones, causes and resulting problems. Panel 19 will critically analyze which of the post-Cold War expectations turned out wrong or right. The panel will also address which lessons we can learn to better understand contemporary problems and finally touch upon some key questions concerning the near political future and how to deal with them.
AFK-EuPRA – 17 (Part 1):
(In-)Security, (De-)Militarization, Post-Liberal Developments: Challenges
Chair: Hendrik Bullens (fm Augsburg University COPE, Germany; Eurasian National University Astana, Kazakhstan; EuPRA Board)
Rudra Prasad Pradhan (BITS Pilani KK Birla Goa Campus, India): Silent Wars & Violent Wars: Perspective on Global Peace Investment
Havva Kök Arslan (Hacettepe University, Turkey): An Assessment of Prescriptive and Elicitive Approaches to July 15 Coup Attempt in Turkey
Roisin Smith (Maynooth University, Ireland): To Act or not to Act in our Age of Insecurity
Papers in absentia:
Pablo Aguiar Molina (International Catalan Institute for Peace, Spain): Do (No) Armies Make the Difference?
When making Foreign Policy Analysis many elements are taken into account. Surprisingly having (or not having) an army is not been viewed as a relevant factor when making this analysis. Approximately one out of eight countries in the world do not have an army, it is a sample big enough as to allow the search of some common pattern of international behaviour. This paper aims to examine the role countries without armies play in International Relations. The first part of the paper will be focused on clarifying which are the countries not having armies. Once clarified an two fold analysis will be devoted. An initial question of this part would be: do countries without armies behave differently than the rest of countries? Limited size and population are two characteristics common to all these nonmilitarised countries, but can we reveal some kind of similar behaviour in the international scene?
On a second part another element will be examined: is their influence superior to their expected capacities? İn other words, is being nonmilitarised a useful element, specially when treating issues related with peace, armed conflict and/or war? This second part will examine specially the roles played by Costa Rica and Iceland on international organizations, most specially in UN. I will try to reveal if not having an army is, at the end of the day, and on a mere instrumental (not just ethical) basis, a good idea.
Shenin Andrei (L.N. Gumilyov Eurasian National University, Kazakhstan): The Trump Administration and Nuclear Weapons: What’s next?
When Donald Trump arrived to power, many experts were concerned regarding his ideas on U.S. nuclear weapons. Particular attention was paid to his tweet about strengthening the U.S. nuclear arsenal after 25 years of the consistent WMD-disarmament under “The Cooperative Threat Reduction Program” (aka “Nunn-Lugar Program” an array of START treaties). In that preiod, U.S. and Russia removed more than 8,000 warheads and elements of the nuclear triad – submarines, ICBMs and long-range bombers. Now, experts worry that Trump’s aspirations will bury the U.S.-Russian nuclear cooperation aimed at global security.
However, a rather neglected part of today’s debate is that it is happening under the largest modernization of the U.S. armed forces of all times. Based on various calculations, modernization requires from $600 billion to $1 trillion for the next 30 years – an incredible burden. Moreover, since 2011 the U.S. budget is regulated by Budget Control Act 2011 that sets limits for every budget item overspending. Hence, officials have to focus all the more on prioritizing– the nuclear triad, conventional weapons or R&D.
The discussion on strengthening the nuclear triad is regularly fueled by what some call hysteria around the Russian army modernization, North Korean missile launches and Iranian nuclear programs. Trump Administration criticizes U.S-Iranian deal and thinks about allowing U.S. Asian allies – Japan, Saudi Arabia and South Korea – to develop their own nuclear program to defend themselves from potential North Korean aggression. Such ways of nuclear proliferation would be the opposite of NPT efforts and accordingly very dangerous.
As for the U.S., it is worth to mention that officials very rarely develop strategic concepts themselves, preferring ordered expertise from “Think Tanks”. All the American Think Tanks, as well as the U.S. political establishment, are divided into several interest groups in accordance with their political views. For example, “Brookings Institution” is usually considered liberal-democratic, while “American Enterprise Institute” backs neo-conservative groups. Consequently, their discussions will have a significant impact on the decision-making process in the White House and the Congress.
For now, we can see a polarization of views. For example, the conservative “Heritage Foundation” regards Russia’s military modernization as a main threat and a reason for U.S. nuclear triad upgrading, while “Brookings Institution” considers the former merely as replacement of outdated weaponry, and the U.S. should continue with nuclear disarmament as a global security policy.
This paper aims to analyze and clarify views of different interest groups in both the political establishment and expert community on the future of U.S. nuclear weapons – and other – programs – in order to better understand/predict possible/likely directions of the U.S. nuclear policy and its impact on global security.
AFK-EuPRA – 19 (Part 2):
(In)Security, (De-)Militarization, Post-Liberal Developments: To dos
Chair: Itır Toksöz (Doğuş University, Turkey)
Klaus Schlichtmann (Nihon University, Japan): Rethinking Europe in an Unequal World – The Case for a Just and Strengthened United Nations
Die Wahlen über den Verbleib Großbritanniens in der EU haben die europäische Ordnung erschüttert. Der Vortrag/Die Präsentation soll nicht nur die Hintergründe beleuchten, sondern auch zeigen, welche Chancen die neue Situation eröffnet, Chancen, die es vorher so nicht gegeben hat. Allerdings läuft die EU Gefahr, sollten diese Chancen nicht ergriffen werden, dass das Projekt Europa scheitert. Die historischen Versäumnisse nach 1945 und die Tatsache, dass die Europäische Union nach dem Ende des Kalten Krieges nichts unternommen hat, die Vereinten Nationen zu stärken und militärische Friedenssicherungskompetenzen und Einrichtungen zugunsten der Weltorganisation der Vereinten Nationen und einer rechtsverbindlichen Weltfriedensordnung abzubauen, geben Anlass zu Besorgnis. Vor allem die Bundesrepublik hat mit ihrer prompten Wiederbewaffnung nach dem Krieg und zuletzt ihrem aktiven Engagement für eine EU-Armee Zeichen gesetzt, die Zweifel an ihren Absichten aufkommen lassen. Das Militär, die „verdinglichte Unvernunft der Staaten“ (Ekkehart Krippendorff), ist letztendlich, wie die Geschichte der letzten fünfhundert und speziell der letzten hundert Jahre gezeigt hat, nicht in der Lage Frieden und Sicherheit der Bürger auf Dauer zu gewährleisten. Für die neue globale Sicherheitsstruktur, für welche der Beitrag werben möchte, ist auch die Einbeziehung des Globalen Südens eine notwendige Voraussetzung.
Unto Vesa (University of Tampere, Finland): Security, Arms Control, Disarmament and Confidence Building Measures in the Baltic Sea Region
Taking into consideration the stalemete of all disarmament negotiations as well as the worsening situation in the Baltic Sea region, I would like to present another paper as well, discussing the security trends in the Baltic Sea region and the potential of confidence building measures in this region as well as to discuss in this context the prospects of arms control and disarmament in general as well as specifically in Europeparticularly in the Baltic Sea region. There are negative trends even regarding nuclear weapons and the prospects in the immediate future regarding any progress are limited, but even the small positive margins have to be explored.